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The Functional Convergence of 
Appeal and Judicial Review 
MB RODRIGUEZ FERRERE* 
((Judicial review is not the same as appeal" is one of the more
common epithets found in administrative law in New Zealand.
As neat as it is, however, it is not truly reflective of reality. Often,
when considering the determinations of administrative decision-
makers, a court will find itself engaging in the same task in judicia
review proceedings as it does in certain types of appeal. Despite
that functional similarity, however, courts have insisted that the
distinction between the procedures is a valid one. In this article, I
argue that the epithet above is a significant overstatement, and that
in administrative law, there is no jimctional distinction between
review and two types of appeal: those on questions of law and
against exercises of discretion. In making my argument, I will first
outline the different procedures, before showing that the rationales
for differentiating them from one another are no longer sufficient
and that the distinction is no longer desirable. 
I The Procedures Outlined 
At first glance, any argument that suggests appeals and judicial review
indistinguishable appears unorthodox. Peter Cane argues the distinc
is "central to understanding the mechanisms and procedures by whic
*Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. I wish to thank Graham Taylor for sugge
this topic as one worthy of examination and Hanna Wilberg for suggesting that examinat
appropriate scope and later, for her patient, thorough and insightful feedback. This articl
presented at the Legal Research Foundation "New Zealand Administrative Law" Confer
and Workshop, Auckland, January 2015. I deeply appreciate the helpful comments
article received at that forum, in particular, those of Grant Illingworth, QC, whose thoug
commentary was very useful. 
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inistrative law norms are enforced".! Christopher Forsyth states that the 
tems are "radically different"2 and Michael Fordham notes that to conflate 
 two is part of the "forbidden method".3 In New Zealand, Philip Joseph 
es that the courts have proclaimed "an essential difference between 
eal and review"4 whereas Graham Taylor is perhaps the most concise: 
dicial review is not appeal."5 
Closer examination, however, reveals a more complicated situation, such 
t the distinction is "misleading in its simplicity".6 Fordham explains why:7 
Whether judicial review is like "an appeal" depends on what sort of 
"appeal", and what sort of issue, is in mind. There is no universal model 
of an "appeal", and some appeals (eg on a "point of law") are no different 
from judicial review. 
he context of judicial supervision of administrative decision-making, this 
nce matters. Courts in New Zealand, however, seem somewhat determined 
gnore it in favour of maintaining the simplified over-generalisation that 
iew and appeal are always fundamentally different procedures. In this 
cle, I want to examine this resistance and argue such a slavish adherence 
he distinction can have real, deleterious effects. 
To be clear, I do not argue that the distinction between appeal and review 
ompletely unviable, although this is an argument that has currency. 
uably, the most ardent New Zealand supporter of such a view is Philip 
eph. Joseph has argued against the proposition advanced by Lord Nicholls 
irkenhead in Brannigan v Davison8 - that the distinction "is not a piece 
mpty formalism"9 
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The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
unjustified judicial intrusion; and legitimating the Court's power to 
defective decisions - such that it should be regarded as a "relic of the
vires era and might be read its burial rites".!1 
My argument differs from Joseph's in three important respects. 
Joseph bases his argument on the demise of the ultra vires doctrine
argument does not depend upon accepting this conclusion, although
will discuss later in the article, I agree that the ultra vires doctrine no l
suffices as a complete justification for the appeaVreview distinction. Se
I have restricted my argument to analysing the convergence between ju
review and two types of appeal: those on questions oflaw and those ag
exercises of discretion. Finally, my argument focuses only on appeals ag
determinations by administrative decision-makers. I express no vie
whether the division between appeals and review generally is also unten
Rather, my argument is that the distinction between appeal and re
does not, and should not, always exist. It is an over-simplification, 
problematic one at that. 
The over-simplification stems from the fact that New Zealand doe
have a universal concept of an "appeal". The popular conception of
an appeal involves - merits review - only describes one of many t
Those types include "de novo appeals", "general appeals", "appeals 
discretionary decisions", "appeals on a question of law" and "appea
way of case stated". 12 It is, however, the popular conception that the 
has in mind when it makes statements such as: "[a]n application for jud
review is not an appeal, nor is it a fresh hearing of the matter". 13 
some appeals will focus on the merits of a decision and review theoreti
focuses on the process, the distinction the court draws here is only acc
regarding some types of appeal but completely inaccurate regarding ot
Given the multiplicity of different types of appeal, however, it is per
understandable that courts are eager to generalise and simplify. It is an
that I argue they must resist. 
My argument focuses on appeals on questions of law and ag
exercises of discretion, because, as Matthew Smith observes, ther
particular overlaps between the court's role in these two types of a
and judicial review. 14 However, my argument goes one step further
this observation: there is no functional distinction between these typ
11 At [22.3.6]. 
12 See Taylor, above n 5, at [4.01] and MB Rodriguez Ferrere "The Unnecessary Con
in New Zealand's Appellate Jurisdictions" (2012) 12 Otago LR 829 at 830 for a d
analysis of each type of appeal. 
13 Anderson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 23 NZTC 21,472 (HC) at [
14 Matthew Smith The New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (Brookers, Welli
2011) at [6.3]. 
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peals andjudicial review. Regardless of the procedure adopted, the court is 
aging in the same process of supervising administrative decision-making. 
e first step in this argument is to outline the court's role in each of these 
cedures. 
Appeals against exercises of discretion 
e distinguishing feature of an exercise of discretion is that it involves 
irreplicable decision-making process. 15 Instead of making factual 
erminations and then applying an appropriate legal norm or standard 
arrive at a particular outcome, the decision-maker is faced with having 
choose between several and equally valid outcomes. 16 Quintessential 
mples of exercises of discretion include the granting of bailor name 
pression: decision-makers, having regard to several factors, must 
efully consider the range of available outcomes and select that which 
y consider most appropriate. 17 In this way, an exercise of discretion lies 
contrast to simple applications of law to fact,18 and is "to a significant 
ree an osmotic process and cannot be simply explained". 19 
Since there are several valid outcomes, and the decision-maker may 
ive at them through its own view of the situation and weighting of 
ticular factors, an appellate court cannot replicate the decision-making 
cess: it is a matter of subjective appreciation. As neatly explained by 
nckhurst J in A v N: 20 
The discussion centres upon whether the area for personal appreciation 
by the decision-maker is large, in which case the judgment is likely to be 
discretionary. Where by contrast only one view is legally possible, so that 
the decision-maker does not have the margin of appreciation inherent in 
the exercise of a discretion, then the judicial decision is not an exercise of 
discretion. 
ere a decision is discretionary, the appellate court's view is no better and 
ries no greater weight than the original decision-maker's. The resulting 
rgin of appreciation owed to the decision-maker manifests in a restriction 
 Rodriguez Ferrere, above n 12, at 833. 
 At 832-833. 
 Roberts v A Professional Conduct Committee of the Nursing Council of New Zealand 
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The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
of the circumstances when the appellate court will intervene and revers
decision. The Supreme Court in its decision in Kacem v Bashir has rest
those circumstances.21 The decision-maker must have: committed an err
law or principle; taken into account irrelevant considerations; failed to 
account of relevant considerations; or arrived at an outcome that was pla
wrong.22 In other words, in circumstances where the decision-maker
acting beyond the scope of its discretion, the court may intervene. Other
the court must not disturb the original decision. As White J explaine
the context of an appeal against a decision of the Broadcasting Stand
Authority: 23 
The requirement for the Court to hear and determine an appeal as if the
decision of the Authority had been made in the exercise of discretion mean
that the Court may not simply substitute its judgment on the issues for tha
of the Authority .... In the present context the High Court is entitled to give
due deference to the decision ofthe Authority which is, as has already been
noted, a specialist tribunal. 
Unfortunately, this relatively straightforward approach to discretio
decisions is stymied by problems of categorisation. Statute seldom indic
when the decision on appeal is discretionary, and in the absence of
statutory guidance, determining whether a decision had one or sev
permissible outcomes is extremely difficult. 24 Writing in 1969, Kenneth K
identified three factors that only increased the likelihood of a decision b
discretionary, with eight additional factors indicating the breadth of
discretion (and thus the degree of deference owed to the decision-make
Over 40 years later, the same issues persist. For example, as Taylor n
two parallel lines of authority existed as to whether decisions of professi
disciplinary bodies on penalties were discretionary.26 In the face of my
conflicting decisions, a Full Court of the High Court in Sisson v Stand
Committee 2 Canterbury-Westland Branch determined the matter in e
21 Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [32]. 
22 At [32]. 
23 Reekie v Television New Zealand LtdHC Auckland CIV-2009-404-003728, 8 Feb
2010 at [21]-[22]. 
24 Appeals against decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority - that which 
issue in Reekie - are one of the few instances where statutory guidance is provide
s 18(4) of the Broadcasting Act 1989: "The court shall hear and determine the app
if the decision or order appealed against had been made in the exercise of a discre
Such guidance is the exception rather than the norm. 
25 KJ Keith "Appeals from Administrative Tribunals: The Existing Judicial Experi
(1969) 5 VUWLR 123 at 135-151. 
26 Taylor, above n 5, at [4.07]. 
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holding that these types of decisions were value judgements and thus 
scretionary in nature. 27 Later that year, the Court held in Davidson v 
and Standards Committee 3 that Sisson ought to be followed because 
as] the most recent view of a Full Court of this Court",28 indicating 
 might be the final word on the matter. However, only two months 
to that second decision, the Court adopted a contrary approach in 
ndan v Real Estate Agents Allthority.29 The only certainty, therefore, is 
stinguishing discretionary decisions from non-discretionary decisions 
mplicated task. Thus, while there is consensus over the court's role in 
s against discretionary decisions, the preliminary question of when it 
to adopt that role is the difficulty. 
peals on questions of law 
ls on questions oflaw suffer from a different, but equally problematic, 
f classification. Unlike appeals against exercises of discretion, appeals 
stions of law are necessarily demarcated by statute.30 Faced with a 
rily restricted right of appeal, appellants are incentivised to frame 
rounds of appeal as questions of law, and the court must prevent 
pellant from exceeding its statutory appeal rights. The classification 
s thus not what type of appeal is before the court - statute always 
es the answer to this - but instead whether the matter on appeal is 
 question of law. 
stice Blanchard, for a majority ofthe Supreme Court in Vodafone New 
nd Ltd v Telecom New Zealand Ltd, stated both the role of the court in 
ppeals and the classification issue that arises:3 ! 
ese are appeals on questions of law. They are not general appeals. We 
re not asked to say whether the [Commerce] Commission's decision is 
 best outcome. It may not be. The questions asked of us, instead, were the 
ch more limited ones of whether the Commission has, in the first place, 
son v Standards Committee 2 Canterbury-Westland Branch [2013] NZHC 349, [2013] 
AR 416 at [14]-[15]; and Taylor, above n 5, at [4.07]. 
vidson v Auckland Standards Committee 3 [2013] NZHC 2315, [2013] NZAR 1519 
[9]. 
mandan v Real Estate Agents Authority [2013] NZHC 1528 at [7]. 
r example, s 100(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2001, the statute at issue in 
dafone New Zealand Ltd v Telecom New Zealand Ltd [2011] NZSC 138, [2012] 3 
LR 153, discussed below, restricted appeals against decisions of the Commerce 
mmission to questions of law only. 






































The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
misinterpreted what is required of it by the Telecommunications Act and
secondly, if not, whether what it has done is nevertheless so misconceive
that it is an unlawful decision. 
Thus, a question of law can arise either when the decision-m
misinterprets the law or arrives at a "misconceived" outcome. An ea
decision of the Supreme Court - Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd32 -
that "misconceived" means that the "proper application of the law req
a different answer". 33 This is the second type of error of law enunci
by Lord Radcliffe in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow?4 Wh
decision is baseless, contradictory and/or unreasonable, the decision-m
must have misconstrued or misapplied its legal powers, therefore justif
an appellate court's intervention.35 
The meaning of reasonableness in Lord Radcliffe's formulation
matter of debate. In the recent decision of New Zealand Transport Ag
v Architectural Centre Inc,36 Brown J was clear that reasonableness in
context of a question oflaw is not used in the same way regarding exer
of discretion, where different decision-makers could "reasonably" arri
different outcomes without appealable error.37 Instead, as Brown J n
Lord Radcliffe was clear that reasonableness meant "only one poss
conclusion was in contemplation as being reasonable: one in which
true and only reasonable conclusion contradicts the determination".38 
is in contrast to the view of Wild J in Wolf v Minister of Immigratio
who held a decision that is "unreasonable" in administrative law term
standard that will vary with the context, and does not suggest that only
reasonable conclusion exists) is erroneous in law for the purposes of app
on questions of law.40 
Regardless of which formulation is accepted, however, it is folly to t
that there is any objectivity in second type errors oflaw. As Timothy End
nores, Lord Radcliffe's formulation risks manipulation and misappropria
by an appellate court.41 There is a degree of objectivity in determining whe
an outcome is "baseless" or "contradictory", since it focuses on the p
32 Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd [2005] NZSC 34, [2005] 3 NZLR 721. 
33 At[26]. 
34 Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 (HL). 
35 At 36. 
36 New Zealand Transport Agency v Architectural Centre Inc [2015] NZHC 1991, [2
NZRMA375. 
37 At [21]. 
38 At [22]. 
39 Wolfv Minister of Immigration [2004] NZAR 414 (HC). 
40 At [41]. 
41 Timothy Endicott "Questions of Law" (1998) 114 LQR 292 at 306. 
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een that outcome and its justification. In contrast, and despite Brown 
sistence otherwise, an "unreasonable" outcome is inherently subjective. 
lustrate: Endicott posits an instance of an unreasonable outcome as one 
e the decision-maker has determined that a "statutory term applies when 
arly does not, or that it does not apply when it clearly does".42 Where 
tatutory term is complex or opaque, "proper application" becomes a 
cult task, and determining the "true and only reasonable conclusion" 
t necessarily straightforward. Since it has the last word on the correct 
ication of a statutory term, in these circumstances, an appellate court can 
ly reverse engineer its analysis to legitimate its otherwise unjustified 
vention: because it disagrees with the outcome, there must have been a 
 misapplication ofthe statutory term, and therefore it is an unreasonable 
ome and an appealable second type error of law. The ease with which 
urt can manipulate the concept of "reasonableness" in this context 
ases the risk of jurisdictional creep. 
ccordingly, although issues of classification arise at different points, 
roblem that persists in appeals against exercises of discretion similarly 
sts in appeals on questions of law. At the core of such appeals, the 
t's jurisdictional limits are clear. However, since the fringes of the 
itions of "discretionary decisions" and "questions of law" are so 
ear, the appellate court may find itself examining aspects of a decision 
in theory, it should not. The appellate court's role in these respective 
s of appeal is therefore simple to define in theory - the court must only 
vene in matters regarding x and defer to the decision-maker's view on 
t in practice, since the division between x and y is blurred, the court's 
may deviate significantly from its theoretical bounds. 
pplications for judicial review 
psulating the court's role when determining applications for judicial 
w is a very difficult task if one wishes to avoid providing a view on 
the court possesses this role. This is because, as Hammond J noted 
ab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, "one of 
undamental difficulties which afflicts judicial review is that there is 
despread disagreement about the fundamental task of the reviewing 
".43 As Hammond J neatly summarised in that decision, the traditionalist 
 of judicial review's purpose is to restrain administrative decision-
ers from acting beyond their legal powers, and the modernist view sees 
At 306. 
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it as encompassing the additional functions of preventing abuses of p
power and incentivising good govemance.44 
However, the core functions of the court in judicial review are n
dispute. The Court of Appeal in Peters v Davison45 accepted the H
of Lords' formulation in Re Preston of when judicial review is availa
"where a decision-making authority exceeds its powers, commits an 
of law, commits a breach of natural justice, reaches a decision whic
reasonable tribunal could have reached, or abuses its powers".46 The maj
joint judgment of Richardson P, Henry and Keith JJ in Peters summar
those different bases by stating that it was the court's constitutional 
to "ensure that public bodies comply with the law"Y Ten years late
arguably its only substantive consideration of the issue, the Supreme C
supported this perspective and formulation of the court's role in jud
review. In Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission, McGrath J
the Court advanced a series of simple propositions:48 
Public bodies must exercise their statutory powers in accordance with the
statutes which confer them. If they make decisions that are outside the
limits of their powers they abuse them. The courts control any misuse o
public power through judicial review. 
Those limits might not be explicit, but as McGrath J adds: "[a] statu
power is subject to limits even if it is conferred in unqualified terms
Thus, as was argued in Unison, even if an expert body such as the Comm
Commission is granted by its parent statute a wide discretion to exercis
power as it wishes, that exercise will nevertheless "be invalid if the deci
maker 'so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy
objects of the Act'''. 50 While this specifically describes improper pur
as a ground of judicial review, taking a very broad perspective, any gro
of review fits within this rubric; each can be framed as simply an additi
requirement for the proper and valid exercise of public power, and there
a limit on that power. As McGrath J concludes, the focus is always on
identification of the limits of public power - in all its forms - and no
44 At [362]-[370]. 
45 Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 180. 
46 Re Preston [1985] AC 835 (HL) at 862 per Lord Templeman. 
47 Peters v Davison, above n 45, at 188. 
48 Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission [2008] 1 NZLR 42 (SC) at [51]. 
49 At [53]. 
50 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL) at 103
cited in Unison, above n 48, at [53]. 
[2016] New Zealand Law Review 
 of its exercise.51 As long as the decision-maker is acting within the 
 of its power, the court will not disturb its decision. 
ommon technique 
escription of each procedure above shows that while there might be 
ences in justification and rationale, they share significant commonalities. 
discuss this in depth later in this article, but for now, it suffices to note 
ach of the procedures utilises the same technique: the court is charged 
etermining the limits of an administrative decision-maker's power, and 
etermining whether it has exceeded them. That technique is necessary 
se of the opacity of the procedures. While formal categories such as 
ises of discretion, questions of law, and grounds of review might have 
ical definitions that apply well enough in core cases, at the penumbra 
is no clarity. Exercises of discretion are hard to identify; questions of 
sily miscategorised; grounds of review hard to distinguish. More often 
ot, the court must engage in a taxonomical procedure - what power 
he decision-maker exercising, and thus when is the court permitted 
ervene - before actually determining whether the decision-maker 
hed the limits of its power. This functional similarity forms the core 
 argument for a convergence of the procedures. Before it is possible 
ke this argument however, I must examine courts' insistence that the 
dures are different, and show that this insistence is misconceived. 
he Bases for Delineation 
it that there are two general reasons why courts, when examining 
istrative-decision making, feel compelled to delineate appeals and 
: the procedures have different genealogies and different effects. This 
ill explain those reasons, but will also explain why they cannot act 
tionale for delineating judicial review from the appeals with which I 
ncerned. 
fferences in genealogy 
ylor neatly explains, "[j]udicial review is the product of the common 





























The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 1
Instead, as detailed in the previous part, it is a "separate assessment 
the courts"53 as to the limits on public power and whether administrati
decision-makers have exceeded them. Appeals are the reverse: a delegation
power by Parliament to the courts to correct certain aspects of administrati
decision-making. 
Appeals are only as old as the statutes that first provided for them
Judicial review, in contrast, can trace its lineage to the development of t
prerogative writs by the Court of King's Bench in the late 13th centu
making it very much separate to, and potentially older than, Parliam
itself.55 When New Zealand's Supreme Court was created in 1841 it w
granted a jurisdiction "as fully as Her Majesty's Courts of Queen's Ben
Common Pleas [sic] and Exchequer at Westminster have in England",
and thus inherited the same inherent jurisdiction possessed by the Quee
Bench. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court (as it is now termed)
preserved by s 16 of the Judicature Act 1908, and although the Judicatu
Amendment Act 1972 and the High Court Rules streamline judicial revi
procedures, at no point does statute grant, confirm or otherwise modify t
Court's inherent jurisdiction to engage in judicial review. 57 
The different sources of the court's power in appeal and judicial revi
might seem sufficient reason to distinguish them. However, that the
procedures have different geneses does not by logical necessity mean t
they are different in substance. There was an additional rationale for why t
distinction was important, which came through the rise ofthe Diceyan mod
of ultra vires in the 19th century. 58 As Paul Craig identifies, a conceptu
distinction between appeal and review was a necessary consequence of t
traditional ultra vires model - and fundamental to its validity. 59 The ul
vires model saw Parliament as unassailably sovereign and omni-compet
with a legislative monopoly over the scope of all government power.60 Und
this model, the court's inherent jurisdiction to engage in judicial revi
53 At [1.01]. 
54 In New Zealand, the first reference to any type of appeal was the Municipal Corporati
Ordinance 1842 5 Vict 6, cl 71 and the first reference to appeals on questions of law 
Land Claims Settlement Act 1856 (19 and 20 Vict 32), s 13. For the first reference
appeals on exercises of discretion see McGregor v McGregor (1889) 7 NZLR 538 (S
at 547. 
55 Philip A Joseph "The Demise of Ultra Vires - Judicial Review in the New Zeala
COUlis" [2001] PL 354 at 357 and 363-364. 
56 Supreme Court Ordinance 1841 5 Vict 1, cl 2. 
57 Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere "The Inherent Jurisdiction and its Limits" (2013) 13 Ota
LR 107 at 113. 
58 PP Craig Administrative Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012) at 6. 
59 At 7. 
60 At4. 
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ramed as simply a mechanism to safeguard Parliament's legislative 
nopoly; the core task of a court in judicial review is to determine the 
dity of an administrative decision-maker's actions measured against the 
adth of their statutory mandate to act. 61 Appeal, on the other hand, was a 
utory grant by Parliament to a court that allowed it to substitute its view 
a decision-maker's in certain areas. Adherence to this model forced an 
erence to a general distinction between appeal and review. 
As the ultra vires model has fallen out of favour, the foundational 
ciples that fortified the approach, such as the appeal/review distinction, 
e come under closer scrutiny. As Joseph identifies, "[u]ltra vires review 
 rooted in the appeal/review distinction, although on any view of the 
e law the distinction was inherently unstable".62 Writing in 1961, ultra 
s proponent Wade himself acknowledged that courts "have in effect 
otten the distinction" between appeal and review with regards to appeals 
questions of law.63 Fifty years later, the orthodox theory behind the 
inction has come under "sustained intellectual assault"64 and Wade's 
oning behind the distinction is "outdated".65 
It is unquestionable that appeals and judicial review have different 
ealogies. The question of greater import is the effect and relevance of 
 difference. As long as there was an adherence to the ultra vires model of 
cial review, the effect and relevance was fundamental. With the model 
wn into doubt, however, it is a difference that may have little impact 
whether there is a principled reason for generally delineating appeal and 
Iew. 
Differences in effect - appeals against exercises of discretion 
arate from the principled, genealogical reason for generally delineating 
eal and review is the practical reason for delineating the procedures: they 
e different effects. The difference is obvious when comparing review 
h general and de novo appeals: in these appeals, simple disagreement 
an appellate court with a decision is all that is required to warrant 
rvention, a threshold considerably lower than judicial review. Less 
At 7. 
Joseph, above n 55, at 368. 
HWR Wade Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) at 43. 
 TRS Allan "Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law: An Elusive Quest for the Limits 
of Jurisdiction" [2003] PL 429 at 429. 
JWF Allison "History to Understand, and History to Reform, English Public Law" 
























The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
obvious is the difference in effect between review and the appeals th
argument focuses on. 
Turning to appeals against exercises of discretion, Cooke P in Sho
Gorge Jet Boats Ltd v Jamieson 66 held appeals against exercises of discr
and judicial review were fundamentally different procedures with diff
effects. The case involved a challenge by Shotover as to the scope 
appeal to the District Court against a discretionary decision. Specifi
Shotover had sought to argue that in the appeal, "the District Court s
not hear evidence and should restrict its inquiry to 'one of review onl
To justify this proposition, the appellant had used judicial review cases
as Wednesbury68 and CREEDNZ 69 as guidance as to the scope and n
of its appeal. The appellant based this argument, Cooke P (as he then
held, on a misconception that such judicial review precedents were rel
in determining the scope of a statutory appeal right: 70 
They are not. They are directed solely to the supervisory jurisdiction of th
Courts by way of judicial review or the prerogative writs or declarator
proceedings or the like. The grounds on which an appellate Court wi
interfere with a discretionary decision are wider than those available i
judicial control proceedings. 
This statement has retained its currency. In particular, it is applied with 
larity in appeals against decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Auth
one of the few instances where the governing statute identifies tha
court must treat the appeal as one against the exercise of a discretion.71
such appeal was the 2011 decision of Television New Zealand Ltd v W
where Asher J strongly reiterated the sentiment of Cooke P, holding
appeals against discretionary decisions are not as "constrained" as jud
review proceedings, and importantly: "There are differences at lea
nuance between a Court's appellate jurisdiction and its supervisory jud
review jurisdiction."73 One difference suggested by Asher J was that 
66 Shotover Gorge Jet Boats Ltd v Jamieson [1987] 1 NZLR 437 (CA). 
67 At 438. 
68 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223.
69 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA). 
70 Shotover, above n 66, at 439. 
71 See above n 24. See generally Television New Zealand Ltd v Ministry of Agric
and Fisheries HC Wellington AP89/95, 13 February 1997 at 20; and Televisio
Zealand Ltd v Viewers For Television Excellence Inc [2005] NZAR 1 (HC) at [19
also Hanna Wilberg "The Bill of Rights in Administrative Law Cases: Taking Sto
Suggesting Some Reassessment" (2013) 25 NZULR 866 at 877-879. 
72 Television New Zealand Ltd v West [2011] 3 NZLR 825 (HC). 
73 At [11]. 
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rmining whether a discretionary decision was "plainly wrong"74 - one 
e grounds that justifies appellate court intervention 75 - the court is "not 
ired to consider the contours of Wednesbury unreasonableness and depth 
view". 76 Similarly, in a different context, the earlier decision of Evans 
w Zealand Parole Board77 applied Shotover to refuse the application 
e administrative law theory of relative invalidity to a decision of the 
le Board under appeal. Justice Miller held that since an "appellate 
rt's jurisdiction in relation to a discretionary decision is not synonymous 
 judicial review", judicial review authorities, and thus, presumably, its 
iples, were not relevant to the determination of an appeal.78 
hus, there is a firm insistence in Shotover, since accepted and reiterated, 
the powers of the court in appeals against discretionary decisions are 
rent in effect to those it possesses in judicial review. Whether the Shotover 
iple remains valid nearly 30 years after it was first established is an issue 
 will examine in the next part, but for now, it is worth assessing whether 
s accurate in the first instance. Both Cooke P's original statement in 
over and Asher J's reiteration of the principle in TVNZ v West cited the 
se of Lords' 1985 decision in G v G 79 as precedent for the proposition, 
loser examination indicates that the precedent simply does not apply, 
if anything, stands for an opposite conclusion. 
he issue in G v G was when an appellate court could interfere with 
cretionary decision of a county court judge. In his judgment, Lord 
er of Tully belton held that the Court of Appeal could not intervene in the 
sion of a county court judge unless the "judge exercised his discretion 
 a wrong principle or that, the judge's decision being so plainly wrong, 
ust have exercised his discretion wrongly".80 However, the reason that 
 Cooke P in Shotover and Asher J in TVNZ cite G v G is what Lord 
er goes on to say is not the threshold for intervention. In an earlier, 
rent decision of the English Court of Appeal, a dissenting judge argued 
the threshold should instead be where the appellate court "concludes 
the course followed by the judge is one that no reasonable judge having 
n into account all the relevant circumstances could have adopted".81 
At [11]. 
See Kacem, above n 21. 
Television New Zealand Ltd v West, above n 72, at [11]. 
vans v New Zealand Parole Board [2005] NZAR 328 (HC). 
At [39]. 
G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 (HL). 
At 652, quoting Lord Scarman in B v W (Wardship: Appeal) [1979] 1 WLR 1041 (HL) 
t 1055. 
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Lord Fraser held that the other members of that Court rightly rejected
threshold, because:82 
That is the [Wednesbury reasonableness] test which the court applies in
deciding whether it is entitled to exercise judicial control over the decision
of an administrative body ... It is not the appropriate test for deciding
whether the Court of Appeal is entitled to interfere with the decision made
by a judge in the exercise of his discretion. 
Lord Bridge of Harwich agreed with Lord Fraser, and emphasised
distinction:83 
I am sure it is important to keep well in view the distinction, although a
fine one, between grounds on which the court will allow an appeal from
an exercise of a judicial discretion on the one hand and the more restricted
grounds on which it will review the exercise of an administrative discretion
on the other hand. 
These dicta show that the distinction made by their Lordships in G v 
not one between appeal and review, but instead judicial and administra
discretions. The focus of their Lordships' analysis is upon the natur
discretionary decisions by judges in particular and how appellate co
ought to be slow in interfering with them. At no point in the judg
is there analysis of the differences between judicial review and app
against discretionary decisions; the distinction is made between ju
and administrative decision-makers. In light of this, Cooke P's relia
on G v G in Shotover for the proposition that judicial review and app
against discretionary decisions are different was misconceived. G v 
not authority for this proposition, and if anything, by making a distinc
not between the procedures but instead between administrative and jud
decision-making, it stands for the reverse. Had the case involved an ap
against an administrative decision-maker and not a county court ju
it appears that their Lordships might have accepted that the nature o
discretion exercised was administrative, and a Wednesbllry reasonable
test was appropriate. Their focus was on the nature of the power and 
was exercising it rather than what procedure brought the matter before th
If Cooke P's reliance on G v G for the proposition that there 
difference between appeals against discretionary decisions and judi
review proceedings was a mistake, then it was a problematic one, for
statement on the difference - now without sufficient authority or substan
82 At 653. 
83 At 656. 
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anation - has been applied and adopted in numerous cases since. As 
d above, Miller J applied the Shotover principle in Evans to support the 
osition that administrative law concepts such as the relative theory of 
idity have no place in the court's appellate jurisdiction, despite the fact 
arole Board in that case was exercising a discretion that was arguably 
 administrative than judicial. Had he applied G v G directly rather 
the corrupted version in Shotover, he might have arrived at a different 
t. Justice Asher's decision in TVNZ is even more concerning, for he 
 both Shotover and G v G for the propositions that judicial review and 
als against discretion are different, and that Wednesbury has no utility 
e latter procedure. Once again, it is highly unlikely that the proper 
ication of G v G stands for the proposition that administrative law 
iples simply are not relevant in appeals against administrative bodies. 
perhaps explains why the many cases in the United Kingdom that apply 
G involve appellate courts interfering with judicial decisions, usually 
lving family law, whereas Shotover is applied in cases that involve 
nistrative decision-makers. 84 
f the Shotover principle is based on an erroneous application of 
rity, then it is an error that has been carried forward and given ostensible 
imacy through its consistent application. However, given the error, there 
 substantive reasoning for the difference between the appeals and review 
ministrative decision-making. The rationale seems to be - sometimes 
citly so - that there must 
UK KeyCite and Shotover 
n LexisNexis New Zealand. 
ayner Thwaites and Dean Knight "Review and Appeal of Regulatory Decisions: The 
ension between Supervision and Performance" in Susy Frankel (ed) Learning from 
he Past, Adapting for the Future: Regulatory Reform in New Zealand (LexisNexis, 
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often [do] disappear".86 Even Wade has noted the courts had forgotten 
distinction, referring to a 1955 case.87 Moreover, Taylor describes error
law as the "basic building block of judicial review" before citing the "clas
statement" of Edwards v Bairstow - that which also defines the ambit
appeals on questions of law - meaning that the two procedures shar
common jurisprudence.88 Nevertheless, two recent decisions of the Hi
Court have insisted that they are different procedures, and the princip
from one are not transferrable to the other. 
The first decision is Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd v The Electric
Authority,89 which involved appeals on a question of law against decisi
of the Electricity Authority. In detailing the relevant authorities for 
determination of appeals on questions of law, Ronald Young J adopted 
approaches of the Supreme Court in Bryson and Vodafone,90 before maki
the following observation:91 
It is important to keep in mind in making these assessments that the 
[Electricity] Authority is an expert body in the electricity industry and 
that this expertise plays an important part in its fact finding. Many of 
the decisions in this area are judicial review decisions. There is a clear 
difference between review and, as here, appeal. Here, a direct challenge to 
the correctness of the decision is authorised. 
In making these comments, Ronald Young J cited the Court of Appea
decision in Major Electricity Users' Group Inc v Electricity Commission,
which indicated that the expertise of the Electricity Commission, t
Electricity Authority's predecessor, was relevant to the standard and intens
of review in judicial review proceedings, justifying a more deferent
approach by a reviewing court. In holding that there was a "clear differen
between proceedings such as those,93 and the appeal currently before hi
Ronald Young J thus appeared to be saying that the expertise of the Author
was not relevant to the determination of a question of law. His use of t
word "correctness"94 indicated that he would not defer to the Authority at 
86 Keith, above n 25, at 159 as cited in Thwaites and Knight, above n 85, at 226. 
87 Woollett v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1955] 1 QB 103, as cited in Wa
above n 63, at 43. 
88 Taylor, above n 5 at [15.04]. 
89 Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd v The Electricity Authority [2012] NZHC 238. 
90 See Bryson, above n 32, and Vodafone, above n 30. 
91 Bay of Plenty Energy, above n 89, at [82] (citations omitted). 
92 Major Electricity Users' Group Inc v Electricity Commission [2008] NZCA 536 at [
93 Bay of Plenty Energy, above n 89, at [82]. 
94 At [82]. 
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en determining the question of law, and this means that the proceedings 
re in sharp distinction to equivalent judicial review proceedings. Thus, 
 argument of Ronald Young J is that the key differentiation between 
eals on questions oflaw and review is that the concepts of deference and 
nsity that apply to the latter are simply not relevant to the former, which 
lways based on a correctness standard of zero deference to the original 
ision-maker. 
In T v Immigration and Protection Tribllnal,95 decided only four months 
r, Collins J adopted a similar approach to Ronald Young J in Bay of 
nty Energy. This decision involved an application for judicial review 
a decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal to deport the 
licant to Ethiopia. The focus of the review proceedings was whether 
 Tribunal made a reviewable error of fact in its decision. Justice Collins 
ed that while challenging an error of fact would be difficult in an appeal 
a question of law, since the applicant had elected to seek judicial review 
he decision, the court's approach could be more flexible: 96 
[A]n application for judicial review that is based upon reviewable errors of 
fact does not necessarily face the same hurdle as an appeal on a question 
of law that is based upon erroneous factual findings. This is particularly 
so in cases where the decision-maker's conclusions will have serious 
consequences for an applicant. In cases such as the present it is incumbent 
upon the Court to carefully scrutinise the IPT's factual finding ... 
s is the same approach taken by Ronald Young J with the opposite 
ult. Whereas a less intense standard of review would have applied to 
Electricity Authority, but was irrelevant given the proceedings were 
appeal on a question of law, a more intense standard applied to the 
migration and Protection Tribunal, and this was relevant because the 
ceedings Were in judicial review. The judgments thus unintentionally 
rk in concert to prove the rule they invented: the role and approach of 
court depends on the type of proceeding, the proceedings were different, 
 so different approaches were appropriate. This argument is circular, but 
wed from a result-based perspective, if that rule was consistently applied, 
anifest difference between the two procedures will result in a similar 
y to that which occurred in the Shotover line of jurisprudence: they are 
erent because the courts have treated them differently. 
 Tv Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2012] NZHC 1871. 
 At [21] (citations omitted). Curiously, and perhaps proving my point, Collins J relied 
upon, inter alia, Wolf, above n 39, for this proposition, which as discussed earlier (and 
again below), was an appeal on a question of law (not an application for review) that 






























The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
The High Court, however, is not consistent on this point. In Chorus 
v Commerce Commission,97 K6s J followed United Kingdom precedent 
held that there was no material difference between the two procedures. 
proceeding involved an appeal by Chorus against a determination of 
Commerce Commission. The Commission is essentially an equivalent bo
to the Electricity Authority in terms of its regulatory role and its experti
but K6s J's approach to the applicability of judicial review principles
the appeal was in significant contrast to Ronald Young J's approach in 
of Plenty Energy. Justice K6s began his analysis by stating that the t
procedures were essentially identical:98 
There was little disagreement before me on the relevant principles applying 
to appeals of law '" The governing principles may be drawn from either 
appeals on questions oflaw, or judicial review proceedings involving alleged 
error of law. As the Court of Appeal of England and Wales observed in E 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, it has become a generally 
safe working rule that these grounds for intervention are identical across 
the two streams. 
This is a similar approach to that of Wild J in Wolf, who held that unreas
ableness, as it applies in judicial review, will similarly apply in appe
on questions of law.99 Additionally, the House of Lords held in Gillie
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 100 that a "breach of the princip
of natural justice is essentially a question of law" .101 
However, the most forceful explication of this approach is 
decision that K6s J cited in Chorus, E v Secretary of State for the Ho
Department. 102 E related to the Court's ability to hear an appeal against
earlier determination of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the availabil
of introducing new evidence in the appeal. In resolving the discussion ab
whether the grounds for challenge of a Tribunal decision would chang
the proceeding was a judicial review instead of an appeal on a question
law, Camwath LJ held for the Court that "[i]t would certainly be surpris
if the grounds for judicial review were more generous than those for
appeal. ... There is certainly no logical reason why the grounds of challe
should be wider in such cases."103 Moreover, Camwath LJ did not rest
97 Chorus Ltd v Commerce Commission [2014] NZHC 690. 
98 At[ll]. 
99 Wolf, above n 39, at[41]. 
100 Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 WLR 781 (HL). 
101 At [6]. 
102 E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 (CA). 
103 At [40]. 
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equivalence between appeals on questions of law and judicial review 
 where the judicial review proceedings involved an error oflaw. Instead, 
ividing line is not between appeal and review, but instead between the 
ous types of appeals themselves: 104 
The main practical dividing line is between appeals (or review procedures) 
on both fact and law, and those confined to law. The latter are treated as 
encompassing the traditional judicial review grounds of excess of power, 
rrationality, and procedural irregularity. 
re are, of course, some differences between the two procedures, but the 
ect matter - the grounds giving rise to challenge - are identical. 105 
After diverging from Ronald Young J's approach to the general issue as 
hether judicial review and appeals on questions of law are similar, K6s 
Chorus also diverged from his approach to the relevance of the expertise 
e body under appeal. Whereas this was an essentially irrelevant issue 
Ronald Young J, once K6s J had accepted that the approaches to error 
w under appeal or review were equivalent, he accepted that "greater 
ude in reviewing the exercise of a tribunal's fact-finding function will 
iven where that function involves determination within the tribunal's 
cular area of expertise". 106 Justice K6s's authority for this principle was 
Supreme Court's decision in Unison, and as if to underscore the point, 
tated that although Unison was "a judicial review challenge, as I have 
ady said the principle applies equally in appeals confined to questions 
w" .107 
Despite the historical ambivalence over the difference between review 
appeals on a question of law, in the past three years, one High Court 
sion has stated that there is a "clear difference"108 between them, and 
her High Court decision has stated that they "are identical". 109 There is 
 no clear consensus that there is a substantive difference in the effect of 
wo procedures, and thus this is not a sufficient basis for their continued 
rgence. Instead, as the next part will discuss, the confusion that these 
s represent is instead a good justification for their convergence. 
At [42]. 
At [42]. 
Chorus, above n 97, at [20]. 
At [21]. 
Bay of Plenty Energy, above n 89, at [82]. 
























The Functional Convergence of Appeal and Judicial Review 
III The Argument for Convergence 
The focus of my argument is functionaL The grounds available for appe
against exercises of discretion and questions of law and judicial review 
indistinguishable and directed to reviewing the same exercise of power
administrative decision-makers. Any distinction is simply to serve a fruitl
task of categorisation for categorisation's sake and serves no useful t
in guiding a court as to its proper role when intervening in administrat
decisions. Moreover, abandoning the distinction would not represent a l
into the great unknown. There are already indications in statute that suc
convergence would represent a gain in practical efficiency, and the mer
has not caused difficulty in other jurisdictions. In that sense, the argum
has two parts: the redundancy ofthe status quo, and positive practical imp
of convergence. 
A The redundancy of the status quo 
The first step in showing a functional equivalence between the th
procedures outlined in the first part of this article is to show the similarit
between appeals on questions of law and against exercises of discreti
expanding on the preliminary remarks I made in that first part. The quest
has never received thorough examination by the courts, with Duffy 
decision in B v B perhaps providing a reason for this paucity of analysis
This judgment was an attempt to determine the import and applicati
of the Supreme Court's decision in Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Sticht
Lodestar (Austin Nichols).III Austin Nichols provided guidance to appell
courts as to their role on general appeals, so long as the decision appea
from was one involving a judgement of fact and degree and not an exerc
of discretion. 112 The clarity of the guidance was undermined by proble
of classification and application, leading to many decisions followi
Austin Nichols spending time determining whether the guidance applied
particular circumstances. 113 In B v B, Duffy J held that Austin Nichols appl
to an appeal against a decision by the Family Court granting a parenti
relocation order under s 143 of the Care of Children Act 2004. In coming
this conclusion, Duffy J noted that: 114 
110 B vB [2008] NZFLR 1083 (HC). 
111 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 1
112 At [17]. 
113 Rodriguez Ferrere, above n 12, at 829. 
114 B v B, above n 110, at [43]. 
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 read the appeal right in s 143 as if it were an appeal from the exercise of a 
iscretion would be to constrain an appellant's rights. It would remove from 
e appellant the right to have his or her appeal dealt with in accordance 
ith the Lodestar principles. It would effectively convert the general appeal 
ight, given in s 143, into something resembling a right to appeal on a 
uestion of law only. 
ce Duffy, in holding that the effect of treating the decision as an 
ise of discretion would mean that the appeal rights would resemble 
 available on a question oflaw, is revealing and accurate. Each type of 
al has a restricted set of grounds for intervention by an appellate court. 
ough the reasons for the restriction are different - it is the type of 
ion that restricts the grounds in appeals against exercises of discretion 
he type of appeal that restricts the grounds in appeals on questions 
w - there is no practical difference between the restricted grounds 
selves. This is reflected in the Supreme Court's guidance for such 
vention, which is near identical. Kacem v Bashir indicated that appellate 
s can intervene in discretionary decisions when the decision-maker 
committed an error of law or principle; taken account of irrelevant 
derations; failed to take account of relevant considerations; or arrived 
 outcome that was plainly wrong. 115 Bryson v Three Foot Six indicated 
ppellate courts can intervene in appeals on questions of law when the 
ion-maker has misinterpreted the law - which includes both error of 
nd irrelevant/relevant considerations - or arrives at a misconceived 
me that indicates such a misinterpretation has occurred. 116 Although 
ypes of appeal are different, the thresholds for appellate intervention 
unctionally identical. 
he second step is to determine whether judicial review shares 
monalities with the different types of appeal. Regarding appeals on 
ions of law, this is not a significant hurdle. In light of the considered 
sis inE,117 it is safe to assume that the decisions in Bay of Plenty Energy 
 are incorrect, and cases such as Wolf, Gillies or Chorus are correct: 
rounds for intervention in appeals on questions of law and review are 
ical. This view is not only consistent with long-standing House of Lords 
dentl18 but also New Zealand's historical approach to the issueY9 
he cursory discussion of the point in both Bay of Plenty Energy and T 
ates there was an erroneous assumption that the different procedures 
ee Kacem, above n 21, at [32]. 
ee Bryson, above n 32. 
ee E, above n 102. 
e Preston, above n 46, relied upon in E at [42]. 
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required different approaches - a direct effect of overstating the ge
distinction between appeal and review. This conclusion is only bolster
the fact that T, in stating that judicial review "does not necessarily fac
same hurdle as an appeal on a question of law",120 since judicial rev
approach to reasonableness can vary with the context, ironically relies 
inter alia, Wolf, which was not an application for judicial review, but r
an appeal on a question of law. 121 
Equating the grounds for intervention in appeals against exercis
discretion with judicial review is slightly more difficult since there 
equivalent precedent that is as considered and as definitive as E or Ch
The decisions of TVNZ v West and Evans insisted that there was a nua
difference between the two procedures, but did not articulate a substa
reason for why the difference existed beyond citing Shotover, which f
reasons explained above, incorrectly relied upon the House of Lords , dec
in G v G. Indeed, it seems the only substantive reason for the diffe
articulated by the courts is that: they must be different, for otherwise, w
the different procedures exist? Such was the reasoning in Brownlow v Mi
of Social Development, 122 which involved an appeal against sentence
the appellant was convicted on charges of benefit fraud. Justice Will
held that the appeal was one against an exercise of discretion, 123 and tha
meant any concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness was inapplicable
reasoning behind this conclusion was as follows: 124 
Sometimes these distinctions are more apparent than real, but it is importa
to remember that the May v May [equivalent to the Kacem v Bashir
standard is not merely a repeat of the orthodox administrative law ground
of relevance and rationality (in the sense of Wednesbury reasonableness
If it was, there would be no point in having an appeal provision at all. Th
respondent goes too far therefore in suggesting that "plainly wrong" mean
unreasonable or irrational in the Wednesbury sense. 
Had Williams J made a distinction on the basis of the nature of the deci
maker rather than the nature of the appeal, he might have been on so
ground. However, the simple presence of an appeal provision cannot s
as substantive justification for the difference between the two proced
There will always be substantial overlap in the content of the com
law and equivalent statutory provisions, and there is nothing inher
120 T, above n 95, at [21]. 
121 At n 7 (albeit spelled incorrectly). See also n 96, 
122 Brownlow v Ministry of Social Development [2013] NZHC 3538. 
123 At [11]. 
124 At [42] (emphasis added). 
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lematic in cross-pollinating the principles of one with the other. As Lord 
n noted in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
son: "[u]ltimately, common law and statute law coalesce in one legal 
m".125 Parliament consistently codifies or incorporates common law 
ciples in legislation and assumes that the court will apply other common 
principles to fill any gaps. 126 
This cross-pollination is clear regarding appeals on questions of law 
review. Indeed, the court has promoted such overlap in this area. In a 
 Court decision of the High Court in Police v Aylwin,127 Baragwanath 
dicated to Parliament that the provision of an appeal on a question of 
- rather than existing mechanism of an appeal by way of case-stated 
ould be a better approach, given it essentially already existed "in the 
ogous sphere of judicial review [and] may be considered simpler and 
e efficient". 128 Moreover, in its explanation of why appeals on questions 
w and judicial review were identical, the England and Wales Court of 
eal in E stated that "the history of remedies in administrative law has 
 the gradual assimilation of the various forms of review, common law 
statutory". 129 Far from proving that the two procedures are functionally 
rent, the existence of a parallel statutory procedure may instead show 
Parliament has assimilated the extant common law processes. 
Moreover, it seems courts have shown no reluctance to apply 
inistrative law concepts such as Wednesbury unreasonableness in 
eedings other than judicial review. This includes appeals against the 
ting of a discharge of conviction under s 106 of the Sentencing Act 
,130 and a review of the limits of a trustee's discretion under the relevant 
 deed. 131 Accordingly, a much more efficient and justifiable approach is 
of Fogarty J in the recent decision of Shotover Park Ltd and Remarkables 
k Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District COllncil. 132 Shotover Park involved an 
al on a question of law against a decision of the Environment Court on 
asis that the judge failed to consider a case that dealt with similar factual 
legal issues. Determining whether the judge was obliged to consider that 
R v Secretary o/State/or the Home Department, Ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539 (HL) 
at 589. 
At 587-588. 
Police v Aylwin HC Auckland, CRI-2005-404-440, 14 September 2006. 
At [53]. 
E, above n 102, at [41]. 
Commerce Commission v Shukla HC Auckland CRI-2007-404-229, 21 November 2007 
at [2]-[3]. 
DNZ Property Fund Ltd v Argosy Property Management Ltd HC Auckland CIV-20 11-
404-4220, 29 July 2011, applying Craddock v Crowhen (1995) 1 NZSC 40,331 (HC). 
Shotover Park Ltd and Remarkables Park Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council 
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similar case, Fogarty J held that "[t]he principles guiding the exercise 
statutory discretion do not differ depending on whether the exercise is bei
judicially reviewed, or heard on appeal",133 before applying administrati
law authorities and arriving at the conclusion that the similar case was 
a mandatory relevant consideration. 134 
This simple statement of principle by Fogarty J in Shotover Park
conceptually preferable to Cooke P's assertion in Shotover Gorge 
Boats 135 that there is a substantive difference between the review o
statutory discretion and an appeal against the same discretion. There is n
The principles that apply are one and the same, sharing all the hallmar
of judicial reticence to intervene unless there is a substantive or procedu
legal error. Rather than splitting categorical hairs, I favour an approach ak
to that of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Noorani v Merseysi
TEe Ltd, which dealt with an appeal against a discretionary decision of t
Employment Tribunal: 136 
Such decisions are, essentially, challengeable only on what loosely may 
be called Wednesbury grounds, when the court at first instance exercised 
the discretion under a mistake of law, or disregard of principle, or 
under a misapprehension as to the facts, where they took into account 
irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant matters, or where 
the conclusion reached was "outside the generous ambit within which a 
reasonable disagreement is possible", see G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647. 
The ease with which the Court of Appeal in this decision simp
applied Wednesbury to an appeal against an exercise of discretion is 
acknowledgement, just as Fogarty J stated in Shotover Park, that there
essentially no daylight between the applicable principles on review and su
appeals. More importantly, in citing G v G for this proposition, it shows t
misplaced reliance on this decision by Cooke Pin Shotover Gorge Jet Bo
and provides an opportunity for New Zealand courts to use this author
for its proper purpose. 
As was the focus in G v G, the crux ofthe analysis is not what mechanis
brought the review of the discretionary power to the court's attention, b
instead, the nature of the discretionary power. The House of Lords in G
G made a distinction between administrative and judicial discretion. T
Supreme Court in Unison, similarly, indicated that the court must give prop
133 At [70]. 
134 At [109]. 
135 The curious similarity in name to the authority it diverged from is pure coincidence.
l36 Noorani v Merseyside TEe Ltd [1999] IRLR 184 at 187. 
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tude to the expertise of certain administrative bodies. E acknowledges 
t the application of the principles: 137 
will vary according to the power or duty under review; and, in particular, 
according to whether it is a duty to decide a finite dispute (such as that of a 
tribunal), or a continuing responsibility (such as that of a minister or local 
authority). 
ne of these cases stand for the proposition that the mechanism - review 
ppeal- will determine the court's role, and appropriately so, since these 
chanisms can and do rely upon the same principles. 
Thus, the argument is that the principles applicable to each of judicial 
iew, appeals on questions of law and appeals against exercises of 
cretion are identical and the mechanism that invokes those principles is 
levant to their content; the distinction between them is redundant from 
rincipled and functional perspective. The three procedures may have 
erent genealogies and different sources and those differences may have 
ated a legacy of courts enforcing a distinction. However, at their hearts, 
h procedure involves a court examining the same exercise of public 
er. It makes sense from the perspective of theoretical consistency and 
inistrative certainty that they are treated as functional equivalents. 
The practical implications of convergence 
pite arguing for that functional equivalence, however, I acknowledge 
 there are some important practical differences between the different 
cedures. As E acknowledges, judicial review will sometimes have an 
antage of "relative procedural fiexibility"138 over appeals since a court 
 the discretion to expand the scope of the review to subsequent or 
er decisions. 139 Taylor makes a similar observation, focusing on the 
ential advantages judicial review provides over appeals with regard to 
admissibility of evidence. 140 Rule 20.16 of the High Court Rules only 
mits parties to adduce further evidence - that is, beyond that which was 
E, above n 102 at [43]. 
 At [43]. 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Turgut [2001] 1 All ER 719 
(CA) as cited in E, above n 102, at [43]. 
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before the original decision-maker - in appeals with leave of the co
which it can only grant if special reasons exist for hearing that evidence
Acknowledging that different procedures regarding the eviden
record apply in appeal and review, it remains questionable whether t
have significant impact on the content of that record. The High C
Rules provide the ability to seek a report from the decision-makerl42 an
transcript of evidence before it. 143 Evidence in judicial review proceedi
is usually adduced by way of affidavit, and this method of evidence 
properly contextualise the original decision in the same way a report can
Where the focus of an appeal and review is upon the same subject ma
- an administrative decision - then it only makes sense that the eviden
record will also be the same. As the Court of Appeal noted in Fiordl
Venison v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, "administrative law
not a formal or technical field, but one in which it is vital for the C
to be as fully informed as reasonably possible of the facts and issues
they presented themselves at the time to the authority whose decisio
under review". 145 This must also be a touchstone for an appellate court. 
technical differences in these procedures will often be inconsequential, 
certainly not sufficient reason for the courts to apply different princip
when determining the proceedings. 
Taylor indicates that it will be sometimes be advantageous
simultaneously maintain appeal and judicial review proceedings, especi
when fresh evidence is likely to be adduced, in order to maximise the chan
of that evidence being heard. 146 The case he cites, however, Marlboro
Aquaculture Ltd v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries, 147 invol
the "complicated", "difficult" and unique Aquaculture Reform (Repeals 
Transitional Provisions) Act 2004 and cannot be considered indicative
normal review and appeal proceedings. 148 In any case, as Clifford J note
that decision, it would be "somewhat impracticable to distinguish" betw
the two proceedings in terms of the available evidential record, cit
141 See High Court Rules, IT 20.16(2) and 20.16(3). Different rules apply to those app
where questions of fact are at issue, but do not concern us for the purposes ofthis arti
142 High Court Rules, r 20.1S. 
143 Rule 20.14. 
144 C v Legal Complaints Review Officer [2012] NZAR 924 at [11] (HC). 
14S Fiordland Venison Ltd v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1978] 2 NZLR 341 (
at 346. 
146 Taylor, above n S, at [4.03]. 
147 Marlborough Aquaculture Ltd v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries 
Wellington CIV-2009-48S-S00, 13 August 2010. 
148 At[S]. 
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rdland Venison as authority for this approach, thus perhaps indicating 
 separation is also unnecessary. 149 
Finally, I also acknowledge the numerous occasions where the court has 
rtained simultaneous appeal and review proceedings. ISO However, it is 
able that the existence of such simultaneous procedures is the result 
he misconceptions I detailed earlier. In Tiumalu v Removal Review 
hority, lSI Robertson J directed that both the applicant's appeal (on a 
stion of law) and application for review regarding a removal order be 
rd simultaneously, given "the administrative law nature of many of the 
ments" and to ensure "all possible lines of attack" were advanced. 152 
h an approach indicates there was some difference in the effect of each 
cedure. However, the grounds of judicial review - mistake of fact, 
ure to take into account relevant considerations, taking into account 
evant considerations, and substantive unreasonableness - mimicked the 
nds of appeal to such a degree that they were essentially all dismissed for 
same reasons. 153 There might have been a perception (by the appellant) 
 there was a tactical advantage in both appealing and applying for 
ew. Certainly, well-resourced (or desperate) appellants may welcome 
pportunity to challenge an administrative decision through two different 
es. However, given the similarity of the functions of each procedure, 
 an advantage is illusory. 
The only explanation for the court and an appellant choosing to 
ntain the two procedures is an obstinate adherence by the court to the 
conception that the procedures are fundamentally different and thus 
ld lead to different results. It is an obstinacy that has led Parliament to 
rvene in immigration law, an area that has attracted many simultaneous 
eal and review proceedings. As Taylor notes, the Immigration Act 2009, 
Smith, above n 14, at [28.5.1]. 
Tiumalu v Removal Review Authority HC Auckland HC67/96, 21 October 1996. 
At 3 as cited in Smith, above n 14, at [28.5.1]. 
At 8; and 12. 
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little substantive consequence, I wish to conclude with a forecast as to 
proceedings would look like if the distinction between the procedures
abandoned. Helpfully, this is not a difficult task, for such proceedings 
already occurred in New Zealand and have occurred in Canada for m
decades without incident. Put simply, the practical effect of abandonin
distinction is that one procedure will suffice to cover the issues that w
hitherto have required both an appeal and review. 
As referred to earlier, one of the most important recent administr
law cases, Wolf v Minister of Immigration, provides, as Thwaites and Kn
observe, a "vivid example" of abandoning the distinction between appeal
a question oflaw and judicial review. 155 Wolf, standing as it did for a stock
of New Zealand's approach to intensity of review, was very importa
administrative law jurisprudence. Many, if asked to recount what typ
proceeding Wolf was, would instinctively reach for judicial review as
answer. It was, however, as I have indicated earlier, an appeal on a ques
of law under s 117 of the Immigration Act 1987. At no point, however,
Wild J in the decision engage in a justification for why administrative
principles were relevant or why it was legitimate to fuse the two proced
he simply did so efficiently and without incident. 156 Other cases have t
the same approach, applying administrative law jurisprudence to app
on questions of law, leading to a rich and thorough analysis of the rele
issues and, most importantly, an attempt to truly clarify the proper rol
the court's intervention without the distraction of considering which typ
procedure brought the issue to court. 157 
New Zealand courts appear far more reticent in taking a similar appr
to appeals against exercises of discretion and applying administrative
principles to those appeals. Canadian jurisprudence provides an exce
example of why that reticence is misplaced. In the Supreme Court of Cana
decision of Q v College of Physicians & Surgeons of British Columbi
McLachlin CJC held that the assumption that "because the Act gran
right of appeal, the matter could be dealt with without recourse to the u
administrative law principles" was "erroneous".159 In Canada, the c
approach to administrative decisions does not change simply becau
proceeding was brought by way of appeal and not review: an "administr
155 Thwaites and Knight, above n 85, at 226. 
156 Wolf, above n 39, at [41]. 
157 An excellent example is the decision of Mallon J in Zajirov v Minister 0/ Immigr
[2009] NZAR 457 (HC), in which counsel for both appellant and respondent acc
the applicability of judicial review principles on appeal, making it a thoroug
considered judgment. 
158 Q v College o/Physicians & Surgeons o/British Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 226. 
159 At [20]. 
[2016] New Zealand Law Review 
ion on a statutory appeal is to be addressed in the same manner as is 
icial review". 160 
2014 SKQB 389 at [23]; and Ontario 
ociety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Johnson 2013 ONSC 7038 (SC) at 
]. 
ee Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Khosa 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 
t [28]. 
ezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers) [1994] 2 SCR 557; and Canada 
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the distinction, as per the long-standing practice in Canada and the appr
in some cases in New Zealand. 
New Zealand's approach to administrative law craves taxonomies
classifications. Often, those taxonomical exercises can yield signif
theoretical benefit. 163 The distinction between the appeals I have anal
in this article and review is not one of those beneficial exercises. 
over-simplified and overstated distinction between appeal and re
does not provide the usual benefit of such classification: refined and 
guidance. Instead, that generalised distinction has led to courts appl
the same administrative law principles whilst simultaneously insi
that the procedures are different. Worse, a commitment to a univ
difference between appeal and review has constrained the courts, for
the justification and development of parallel approaches to the same exe
of public power for no other reason than to maintain the distinction it
This makes the distinction between judicial review, appeals on quest
of law and appeals against exercises of discretion costly, inefficient
unjustified. Far from clarifying matters, it makes the court's role all the 
difficult, distracting it from focusing squarely on the issues that apply to 
procedure equally: what circumstances warrant the court's interventio
administrative decision-making. 
To adopt the statement of Williams J in Brownlow: "[s]ometime
distinctions are more apparent than real". 164 Administrative law is a 
replete with problematic distinctions and classifications; it surely doe
need another that is, in reality, a phantom. 
163 Michael Taggart's "rainbow of review" being an obvious candidate: see Michael T
"Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbtl1Y" [2008] NZ L Rev 423. 
164 Brownlow, above n 122, at [42]. 
